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Abstract 
 
We investigate income smoothing behaviour for US bank holding companies. Our sample period 
covers from 1991 to 2013. We investigate whether policy change in late 90s affects income 
smoothing behaviour. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) introduced 
restrictive regulations to charge off of homogenous loans. We find that income smoothing 
continues even after the policy change but the association between provisioning and 
heterogeneous loans is not evident. However we get a significant positive association between 
provisioning and noninterest income. Moreover policy impacts in income smoothing process. 
The association between previous year charge off of homogenous loan and current year recovery 
was strong in 90s US financial institution. But after policy change, this relationship weakened. 
However, income smoothing avenue through previous year charge off of heterogeneous loan and 
current year recovery is still obvious. The association between current year recovery and gross 
loan charge off does not change for homogenous loan after policy change but this relationship 
for heterogeneous loan is stronger even after policy change. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Income smoothing is a long standing empirical finding in different literatures (Greenwalt and 
Sinkey, 1988, Wahlen, 1994, Collins et al. 1995, Agarwal et al. 2007, and Ashraf et al. 2014). 
Banks smooth income to manage taxes and to stabilize the firm’s performance. Smoothed 
earning is preferable to management and stakeholders of the firm than fluctuated earnings 
(Hepworth, 1953 and Beidleman, 1973). Firms utilize different income smoothing items (or 
technics) to smooth earning (Hepworth, 1953; Barnea et al., 1976; Healy, 1985; Chaney and 
Lewis,1995). Firms generally generate the accounting information by following Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles. As financial institution is highly regulated industry, regulatory 
bodies always try to make regulations so that information from financial statement of banking 
industry carries credible information for analysts, investors and other concerned parties.  
These regulations impact the behaviour of the smoothing income. In 1990, the FDIC revised the 
capital requirement regulation. It initiated risk based capital requirement. This change impacts in 
earnings management (Ahmed et al. 1999). Loan loss reserve was a part of Tier I or primary 
capital before policy change for capital requirement in 1991. However, loan loss reserve after 
policy change became a part of Tier II capital and loan loss reserve can contribute maximum of 
1.25% of risk-weighted assets in Tier II capital. As provision for loan loss was the primary part 
of the capital ratio before the policy change for capital requirement, this change in regulations 
reduces the earning management. The reason behind is that increase in loan loss reserve does not 
increase the primary capital under new capital requirement.  On the other hand, in 1993, FDIC 
came up with new regulations under which banks, holding total asset more than 500 million, 
need to make an additional management report. In this report, banks are required to state 
management’s responsibilities with the financial statements and to state that banks maintain 
adequate internal control and develop procedures for financial reporting. It is also required to 
give an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control and to state that banks produce 
information that complies with all laws and regulations. This report needs to be signed by the 
CEO and the chief accounting or financial officer. Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find that these 
additional internal control regulations reduced earning management behaviour to banks, holding 
total assets more than $500 million.  
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Liu and Ryan (2006) find that banks holding more homogenous loan, smooth income more in 
booming period of 90s. Banks charge off homogenous loan and they recover this charged off of 
homogenous loan in next year. One of the main arguments of Liu and Ryan’s (2006) paper was 
that the inadequate rules for charge off of homogenous loan made it easy for banks to smooth 
income through charge off and recovery of homogenous loan. In 1999, FFIEC
1
 addressed this 
issue by imposing more restrictions on charge off of homogenous loans. This study is an 
extension of Liu and Ryan’s paper. We investigate how restrictions imposed by FFIEC in 1999 
have affected the charge off of homogenous loan. We test the same mechanisms of income 
smoothing as Liu and Ryan’s (2006), used over a much longer study period with a specific 
interest to the effect of policy change on income smoothing by banks. There are other studies in 
recent period such as Ahmed et al. (1999) and Altamuro and Beatty (2010) who have also 
investigated effect of accounting regulation change in US banking industry, however, none of the 
study to our knowledge has investigated the FFIECs policy change. Similar to these studies we 
use dummy variable methodology to capture the effect of policy change. We expect that income 
smoothing will continue even after the policy change. However, the mechanism, which was 
applied in the 90s to smooth income, might be weakened. With restrictive regulations for charge 
off of homogenous loan, we expect that association between heterogeneous loan and provision 
for loan and lease losses might be increased.  We find that income smoothing continues even 
after policy change. We find that association between charge off of homogenous loan and 
subsequent year recovery is less after policy change.  Our findings will contribute to existing 
income smoothing literature. It will give an idea to policy makers whether an intended effect was 
achieved after policy change.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews literature regarding 
income smoothing, accounting regulations and relevant regulatory changes for charge off of 
loans. Chapter 3 discusses hypothesis development. Chapter 4 discusses data and variable 
definition and Chapter 5 discusses methodology. Chapter 6 analyses the results. Finally in 
Chapter 7, we give conclusion.  
                                                          
1
FFIEC noticed the abnormal charge off and subsequent recovery by investigating Sun Trust Banks. In 90s booming 
period, Sun Trust Banks recovered almost 40% of previous year charge off. Sun Trust Banks recovered high 
percentage of charge off from 1993 to 1997 (Ryan, 2007). 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Income Smoothing 
Literature of income smoothing is evolved around few ideas. Earlier literature tries to focus on 
reasons of income smoothing and try to indicate the accounting choice or accounting items 
which are related with income smoothing. Hepworth (1953) posits that few major reasons 
contribute to income smoothening. At firm level, he argues that tax advantage is an important 
factor. Moreover, the owners and creditors would like to invest in a firm that shows stable 
performance. He also posits an explanation for income smoothing in aggregate economic level. 
When firms show bad figures i.e. low income in current year, it will create an expectation that 
the economy will be in stagnant position in future. From this point of view, he argues that 
income smoothing contributes to stabilize economy. He also mentions some accounting items 
which might be used to smooth income. Those are gross revenue manipulation, deferred charge 
(or charge off) and intangible asset accounting, inventory accounting, property accounting, and 
reserve accounting. He argues that these could be potential tools for smoothing income in line 
with regulatory requirements. However, some literature addresses this issue from the perspective 
of long standing tension between principles and agents. Gordon (1964) discusses different pros 
and cons about postulates and principles of accounting in this paper. He argues that corporation’s 
performance is an important tool for stockholders satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Stockholders’ 
satisfaction ensures growth of the income and job security of the management. He also argues 
that in the presence of a different owner and management, management will accept the 
accounting principles which will smooth income over the years. Lambert (1984) explores the 
income smoothing in line with principle-agent relationship. Here, he assumes that stockholder 
knows that management is going to smooth income. In this context, stockholder makes the 
contract in such a way which will motivate management to take stockholder’s desired strategy. 
This is definitely not the best option. But this is optimal equilibrium behaviour in context of 
agency settings. He focuses on real smoothing rather than accounting smoothing in his study. He 
argues that management has an incentive to choose between production and investment decision 
in such a way that these decisions will help management to have expected utility i.e. bonuses and 
other benefits. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) advances that managers utilize accounting method 
either to increase the wealth of all related parties or to increase his wealth at the expense of other 
parties. Though they don’t argue incomes smoothing explicitly, managers have the capability of 
selecting the accounting methods which will give favourable accounting numbers. Influence of 
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ownership structure of firm is documented in Kamin and Ronen (1978). They argue that 
separation of ownership and management has an influence in smoothing behaviour of the firm. 
They find that management controlled firms smooth income more than owner controlled firms 
do when entry barrier to the industry is high. On the other hand, in cases where is a low entry 
barrier to industry, owner controlled firm do the smoothing more than management controlled 
firm do. 
This literature also discusses the ideal characteristics of smoothing variables. Copeland (1968) 
argues that all financial items are not qualified as smoothing items. He advances characteristics 
which are obvious in smoothing devices. Those are “A. Once used, it must not commit the firm 
to any particular future action. B. It must be based upon the exercise of professional judgement 
and be considered within the domain of “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles”. C. It must 
lead to material shifts relative to year-to-year differences in income. D. It must not require a 
“real” transaction with second parties, but only a reclassification of internal account balances. E. 
It must be used, singularly or in conjunction with other practices, over consecutive periods of 
time”. He also argues that smoothing device should not be obvious as auditors might qualify the 
annual report. In his paper, he finds that dividend from subsidiary company is used as a 
manipulative tool. He focus on different other instruments tools which are used to manipulate the 
income in long horizon. He contends that six year horizon is more valid to observe a firm 
smoother than two year horizons or four year horizons. 
 A very often cited definition of smoothing is given by Beidleman (1973) which mentions 
“Smoothing of reported earnings may be defined as the intentional dampening of fluctuations 
about some level of earnings that is currently considered to be normal for a firm”. He advances 
argument of income smoothing from the internal and external view of the firm. Management 
smooth earnings so that they can make plans and budgets, which will not fluctuate too much in 
the long run.  It would be difficult to achieve fluctuating targets rather than to achieve smoothed 
targets. He also argues that the support for smoothing is deeply rooted in capital asset values. As 
investors observe the expected cash flow of a firm, the fluctuating cash flow will affect the 
firm’s value. Investors prefer steady expectation rather than fluctuating expectation. He also 
argues that smoothing helps security analysts as well. Security analysts can use earnings figure 
easily as they don’t need to normalize the earning figures if it is done by management. Analysts 
think that management normalization of the earning figures gives a better idea about the future of 
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the firm. He mentions different items of financial statements which could be arbitrarily used by 
management to smooth the income and his empirical evidence support it. He considers pension 
and retirement expense, incentive compensation, research and development expense, remitted 
earning from unconsolidated subsidiaries, sales and advertising expense, and plant retirements 
smoothing tool in his study.  Beidleman’s (1973) definition of income smoothing is borrowed by 
Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1976) with a significant modification. They argue that the word 
“intentional” should not be in definition. They argue that this is not possible to judge the 
intentions of management with non-behavioural empirical design. They study four industries-
paper, chemicals, rubber, and airlines. They argue that income smoothing can be done in 
different ways.  Smoothing can be done recognizing events carefully, recognizing events’ 
allocation in different time period or classifying intra items so that specific item could be 
smoothed. In this paper, they use extraordinary item as a tool to smooth (1) ordinary income 
before extraordinary items per share and (2) operating income before period charges and 
extraordinary items per share. They argue that investors pay attention to ordinary income and 
make forecast based on ordinary income. On the other hand, analyst and investors judge 
managerial performance based on operating income. They find that extraordinary item is used to 
smooth the ordinary and operating income series.      
Firms employ the different income smoothing tools jointly to achieve firms’ overall objectives 
(Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1981). According to this study firms do not take accounting policy 
choices individually. Firms employ different policies jointly to achieve overall firm’s income 
target. Managers always face different conflicting objectives. To achieve those objectives, 
different types of variables are employed jointly in different combination. For example, firms 
have smoothing tools such as depreciation and inventory. Now firms can choose accounting 
policy to increase the income by choosing depreciation and to decrease income by choosing 
inventory.  
Compensation of management is also considered in income smoothing literature. Healy (1985) 
argues that managers use total accruals to manage the income when their bonuses depend on the 
accounting numbers. However, Gaver, and Gaver (1995) argue that managers rely on 
discretionary accruals to smooth income rather than to achieve the bonus.  They consider the 
accruals net of exogenous factors which determine the nondiscretionary part of accruals. Not 
only compensation plan but also other firm specific factors are taken into consideration (Moses, 
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1987). Moses argues that certain firm characteristics affect the smoothing.  For example, he 
discusses the political cost. Firms with upward earnings could be the subject to regulatory 
scrutiny. This incurs cost for the firm. If any firm is powerful in market, this could lead the firm 
to face antitrust law. So to avoid this kind of unexpected situation, firms might smooth income. 
In this case, he argues that different accounting changes such as to switch to LIFO method, 
change in pension method, change in depreciation method, are associated with smoothing. He 
adds that smoothing is associated with size, bonus plan and expected earning of the firm. 
Literature also addresses the consequences of income smoothing. Broadly, how market perceives 
income smoothing is addressed in this type of literature. Titman and Trueman (1988) posits that 
management smooths income to change the perception of the investors about the firm. So, 
investors perceive the firm less risky. Chaney and Lewis (1995) suggest that the earnings give a 
signal to the investors. Investors place a greater value in smoothed earnings rather than 
fluctuating earnings. Income smoothing, be it good or bad, carries information for the reader. 
They argue that management employ different accounting choices such as LIFO or FIFO 
method, depreciation method, investment tax credit etc. to smooth their income. High value 
firms use more income increasing accounting choices to make a stable look of the future 
earnings. Subramanyam (1996) finds that discretionary accrual carries information for the 
investors. Investors take it as private information. These discretionary accruals are priced by the 
market. This study is based on non-financial institutions. He argues that income smoothing 
conveys message for future earnings. So does discretionary accruals that convey future 
profitability. Michelson et al. (1995) find that firms that have tendency to smooth income incur 
less annualized return than firms that do not smooth income.  Firms that smooth income have a 
lower beta and show a higher market value.  
Above discussion addresses the issue of income smoothing in non-financial sector broadly. But 
income smoothing is evident in all sectors of economy. Belkaoui and Picur (1984) decompose 
the whole US economy into periphery and core industrial sectors. They find that core sector 
employs lesser degree of income smoothing than periphery sector does.  Same stratification of 
economy is used in the study of Albrecht and Richardson (1990). They find that in every sector 
there are some firms which are smoothing income. They find that very large firms in periphery 
sector, based on sales, smooth income more than core sector does. However, overall analysis of 
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this study suggests that every sector of the economy smoothes income in even fashion.  Financial 
institution falls into the core sector of their stratification.  
Empirical investigation in financial sector gives an evidence of income smoothening. Greenwalt 
and Sinkey (1988) find income smoothing behaviour in US economy from 1976 to 1984. In this 
time period, they find significant relationship between earning and provision for loan losses. 
They also conclude that regional Bank Holding Companies (BHC) smooth income more than 
money-centre BHC do.  Wahlen (1994) finds that provision for loan losses has two parts. One 
part is nondiscretionary part that is stemmed from the non-performing loans and to some extent 
from charge off of loans. Another part is the discretionary part of the provision. He advances the 
idea of provisioning from two perspectives. One is information based explanation and another 
one is capital based explanation. According to the information based explanation, unexpected 
part of the provisioning basically conveys the private information of the managers. He shows 
that unexpected provisioning (discretionary part) is positively associated with future cash flow. 
On the other hand, capital based explanation depends on the capital requirement of the regulatory 
authority.  Collins et al. (1995) find support for smoothing earnings. This study uses security 
gain & loss, provision for loan losses to judge the earning management. Moreover, it explains 
that banks manage tax, capital and earning simultaneously. It finds that earnings have positive 
significant relationship with loan loss provisions. It concludes that smoothing behaviour depends 
on the ability and willingness of the banks. Ahmed et al. (1999) study income smoothing among 
banks after the changes regulations for the capital adequacy ratio in 1991 in US economy. 
Though this paper finds no relationship between the provision and earnings in their 
methodology, it shows significant relationship between loan loss provision and earning by 
following the Collins et al. (1995) methodology. Though Collins et al. (1995) uses the beginning 
year non-performing loan to estimate model for loan loss provision, Ahmed et al. (1999) does 
not use beginning year non-performing loan. Ahmed et al. (1995) obtains significant relationship 
between earning and provision for loan loss after incorporating the beginning year non-
performing loan. Relationship between the market value and loan loss allowance is documented 
in Beaver and Engel (1996). This study tries to disentangle the discretionary and 
nondiscretionary part of the allowance for loan loss account. Nonperforming assets contribute to 
nondiscretionary part of the allowance account. On the other hand, profitability contributes to 
discretionary part of the allowance account. This study finds a significant positive relationship 
between earning and discretionary part of provisioning. On the other hand, Beatty et al. (1995) 
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explains that managers in banks make complicated decision about the tax planning, earnings 
management and capital requirement.  In this study, they argue that managers need to make a 
trade off among tax planning, earning management and capital requirement. This paper considers 
the interdependence of these issues. It provides evidence that provisions are not used to smooth 
income.  
Evidence of income smoothing is prevalent outside of US as well. Chen and Daley (1996) 
investigate the discretionary behaviour of management to manage capital adequacy, taxable 
income and earnings. They investigate this issue before significant changes in Canadian banking 
industry in 1987. Sample period for this study is from 1977-1987. They find that loan loss 
experience (LLE) and reserves are utilized to manage capital and that LLE is utilized to manage 
the tax though reserve does not influence in making tax decision. However, they do not find any 
income smoothing behaviour among the Canadian bank
2
.  Agarwal et al. (2007) investigate the 
income smoothing behaviour in Japanese banks. This study segregates the economy in three 
different phases. Those are high growth (1985-1990), stagnant growth (1991-1996) and severe 
recession (1997-1999). The aim of this paper is to investigate Japanese banks’ earning 
management behaviour in above mentioned three economic situations. This study uses 78 
Japanese banks’ balance sheet information. It argues that Japanese bank manage earnings by 
employing lending, securities gain, provisioning and dividend. It uses simultaneous equation 
methodology to address this endogeneity issue. It finds that management use securities gain to 
manage earning for all economic situations but management uses provision for loan loss to 
manage earnings in high growth and stagnant period. On the other hand, lending and dividend 
                                                          
2 Hasan and Wall (2003) compare income smoothing between US banks and non-US banks. Their sample covers 
from 1993-2000. They regress the loan loss allowance on discretionary part (earnings & capital) and non-
discretionary part (non-performing loan, net charge off,  loans). They find presence of income smoothing in US 
banks. But they did not find any relationship between earning and loan loss allowance for Canadian banks. Fonseca 
and Gonzalez (2008) investigate income smoothing behaviour around the world. They observe this phenomenon for 
40 countries. Their sample covers from 1995-2002. They try to incorporate the cross country determinants of 
income smoothing. They consider investor protection, disclosure, regulation and supervision, financial structure and 
financial development of different countries. At the very beginning of their study, they run a regression for earning 
on loan loss provisioning with other control variables for each country. The found no income smoothing in Canadian 
banks. On the other hand, they observe the difference between publicly and non-publicly traded banks. They create 
dummy variable PT which takes 1 if publicly traded and 0 otherwise. Then they interact the earning with PT to 
observe the difference between this two types of banks. For the limited number of publicly traded banks, they cannot 
observe this phenomenon for Canadian banks.  
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differed significantly on how they smooth income in different phases of economy.  Anandarajan 
et al. (2007) observe Australian banks for the first time whether loan loss provision is used for 
capital management, earning management, and signalling theory. They observe this phenomenon 
before and after the implementation of Basel Accord of 1988. Sample period covers from 1991 
to 2001 for 50 commercial banks. They find that bank management uses loan loss provision to 
manage capital and that this behaviour does not change after the policy change. Again, provision 
for loan losses is used to manage earning and this behaviour significantly increased after the 
policy change. However, provision for loan losses does not give any signal for higher earnings in 
Australian commercial banks.  In a recent study, Ashraf et al (2014) find the income smoothing 
in global context. They try to observe whether income smoothing, capital management and 
earning signalling are different for pro-cyclical or dynamic provisioning. When economy is 
booming, banks make less provision and banks provision more in recessionary period. This 
phenomenon is known as pro-cyclical behaviour. On the other hand, when economy is in 
recession, banks make less provision but in booming period, banks make more provision. This 
phenomenon is known as dynamic provisioning. Moreover, they also observe whether income 
smoothing, capital management and earning signalling are different for rules based accounting 
and principles based accounting. Data covers from 1999 to 2010 for 118 countries. They utilize 
capital ratio, earning and lagged provision as explanatory variable. Moreover, they control 
country specific macroeconomic variables and legal framework of the country. They find that 
principles-based accounting generally shows lower level of earning management compared to 
rules-based accounting. On the other hand, dynamic provision makes bank to set aside more 
provision than pro-cyclical provisioning.    
2.2 Related GAAP regulations for loan loss allowance 
Allowance for loan losses is guided by FAS No. 5 (FASB 1975) that is known as Accounting for 
Contingencies. This standard allows bank to accrue loan losses are probable and these losses can 
be reasonably estimated.  An expense for incurred loss or estimated loss is recorded as provision 
for loan losses and an allowance for loan losses account is created for this. When any specific 
loan needs to be charged off, allowance for loan losses account and loan outstanding account are 
reduced for the same amount. If any charged off amount is collected from the consumers, this 
collection is known as recovery. Another regulation is FAS no. 114 (FASB 1993) that is known 
as Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a loan. This provides more specific guidance 
regarding loan impairment and provides guideline for the related disclosure. 
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2.3 Loan segregation and its association with loan loss provision 
Loan loss provision and its relationship with loan composition are documented in Liu & Ryan 
(1995, 2006). They decomposed the loan composition of the banks into two categories. One is 
homogenous loan and another one is heterogeneous loan. The basis of their loan segregation is 
loan size and frequency of loan renegotiation. Homogenous loan implies that the clauses are the 
same for different types of customers such as consumer loans. For consumers loans, terms and 
conditions do not vary for different customers. Unlike consumer loans, industrial loans are 
approved on a loan by loan basis. Terms of loan are decided based on the negotiation between 
financial institution and borrowers. These kind of heterogeneous loans are renegotiated 
frequently based on how a loan performs. Provisions are determined differently for these two 
types of loan. For homogenous loan, statistical basis is used to determine how much provision 
will be made. Contrary, judgement is used to determine provision for the heterogeneous loan. 
Liu & Ryan (1995) argue that loan losses are more timely provisioned for the small and 
infrequently renegotiated loans than for the large and frequently renegotiated loans. They try to 
investigate the market reaction for the loan loss provision. They find that market reaction has 
positive association with the increased loan loss provision for the large and frequently 
renegotiated loan. They argue that market perceives it as good news if any increased provision is 
made for the heterogeneous loan. It works as a buffer for the unexpected loss of the company. 
However, Liu & Ryan (2006) observe a direct relationship between loan loss provision and loan 
composition. They argue that more profitable bank set aside provision more for the future 
unexpected loss in 1990’s booming period of US economy. They find that loan loss provision 
has a strong association with homogenous loan.  
2.4 Charge off 
Charge off is one of the several elements to determine the allowance for provision. If net charge 
off is high for any particular period, the bank management needs to make more provision to have 
a stable allowance for loan and lease losses account. In different income smoothing literatures, 
charge off is regarded as the control variable for the smoothing purpose. Wahlen (1994) argues 
that when any particular loans are deemed to be uncollectible, they are charged off. Different 
factors such as actions by Federal Reserve, bankruptcy proceedings determine how much will be 
charged off from the loan portfolio. He mentions that consumer loan are charged off based on a 
certain amount of days delinquent and that commercial loans involve to some extent judgement 
of the management. He considers the charge off as non-discretionary part.  Again Beatty et al. 
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(1995) considers the charge off as partly non-discretionary part. The study argues that loan loss 
reserve will be driven by loan charge off. Kim and Kross (1998) argue that charge off is related 
with provision by construction of allowance account. Liu & Ryan (2006) study in the 90s 
economic boom, covers the period 1991-2000. The study uses US bank holding companies’ data 
from Y-9C report. They investigate how banks keep stable their loan loss account with 
coordinated approach in 90s unique situation. They regress earnings and homogenous loan on 
provision to see the presence of income smoothing and association with homogenous loan. Then 
they regress lagged charge off on recovery to observe whether previous year charge off has any 
association with current year recovery. Next, they regress charge off on recovery and finally they 
regress earning on charge off of homogenous loan to observe the persistent income for next three 
years. They find that income smoothing is evident in more profitable banks and that more 
profitable banks holding more homogenous loan has greater association between provision and 
earning. They find that more profitable banks charges off of homogenous loan and this charge 
off is recovered at a higher rate in next year. They find that more profitable banks charge off 
more from current year recovery and that charging off more homogenous loan has an association 
between provision and next three years earning. In this study,   Liu & Ryan (2006) consider 
charge off as a strategic tool that is used by management to smooth the income. No previous 
study before Liu & Ryan (2006) considers charge off as smoothing tool. Previous literatures 
always consider charge off as control variable. So charge off as a smoothing tool is a unique 
contribution of Liu and Ryan (2006). Liu and Ryan (2006) argue that charge off is used to 
smooth income in the booming period. They find that bank management smoothens the income 
during the 90s booming period. They conceal the smoothing using charge off. US banking 
industry during 90s charges off of loan in a year and recovers charged off loan in subsequent 
year, a mechanism which helps US bank management to make a stable allowance account. Liu 
and Ryan (2006) find that bank management charges off more from the homogenous loan. In 
90s, consumer loan can be charged off from 180 days to 240 days window of delinquent in 
payment and bank management can change the charge off policy for default loan frequently as 
they need to do so. By using this flexibility, they choose a different charge off window to 
accelerate the charge off in different years. They find a significant association between 
provisioning and homogenous loan. Bank that charges off more homogenous loan this year 
recover more loans next year. Again Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) investigates the impact 
of SEC’s (SAB 102) guidance on association between charge off and allowance for provision. 
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SAB 102 emphasizes on systematic methodology for loan loss allowance and on consistent 
application of this methodology and on documentation of the results of this methodology. This 
study covers sample period 1992 to 2008. It regresses charge off on allowance for provision. It 
finds that the association between past charge off and allowance has increased after the SEC’s 
(SAB 102) guidance. This association is stronger for large banks and strong banks rather than for 
small banks and weak banks. The study segregates large and small bank based on median asset 
size. It differentiates the strong and weak bank based on median capital ratio (total equity scaled 
by total assets). It also finds that allowance carries more information for future loss after SAB’s 
102 guidance. Beck and Narayanmoorthy (2013) attribute their result to SEC’s guidance (SAB 
102). Keely and Ryan (2013) disagrees with Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013).But utilizing the 
same data and same methodology, Keely and Ryan (2013) shows that primary driver for the 
association between allowance and charge off is consumer loan. They emphasize on the loan 
composition for this kind of association. Altamuro and Beatty (2010) investigates the impact of 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1992 (FDICIA) on banks’ reporting 
quality. This study covers sample period from 1986 to 2001. In this sample, 1986-1992 was the 
pre-regulation period and 1995 to 2001 was post-regulation period. It excludes 1993-1994 as this 
was the implementation period. FDICIA imposes extra internal control regulations for the banks, 
holding assets more than $500 million. A difference –in-difference research design is applied in 
this analysis. It is found that the association between provision and next period charge off is 
stronger after the FDICIA-mandated internal control requirements for the banks, holding assets 
more than $500 million. These studies suggest that charge off becomes a determinant factor of 
estimating allowance for loan and lease losses.  
 
2.4.1 Charge off and related regulations 
Change in charge-off regulation is very important for this paper as we test the implication of this 
on bank’s income management. Charge off are done complying to regulations and following 
accounting standards of GAAP. Homogenous loan are charged off following the rules of 
Uniform Policy for Classification of Open-end and Closed-end Credit, which was enforced since 
1980. FFIEC revised this regulation in 1999.  After taking opinion from different regulatory 
bodies and banks holding companies regarding different sections of 1980 policy, FFIEC 
announces the final notice on February 10, 1999.  FFIEC revised the policy for various reasons.  
Firstly, risk profiles of the open-end credit have changed substantially since 1980’s policy. 
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However, 1980’s policy was not comprehensive enough to incorporate these changes. For 
example, there was no specific classification for residential and home equity loan in the 1980 
policy, while this residential and home equity loans consist of substantial amount of consumer 
loan.  Secondly, banks could charge off these loans as needed between 120 days to 240 days 
once deemed as bad loans. Bank uses this option to charge off to smooth its income (Liu and 
Ryan, 2006). Thirdly, differing interpretations of the existing policy made the situation worse. 
Opinion differs among the financial institutions to charge off open end accounts by “the seventh 
zero billing cycle”. All these concerns are addressed in the new regulations.   
Sun Trust bank case is probably a good example of the irregularity in bank reporting of loan loss 
provision, its charge off and subsequent recovery.  Sun Trust banks made large provision for 
loan losses. Liu & Ryan (2006) documented “In November 1998, the SEC required SunTrust 
Banks-which reported a high level of gross charge offs that it recovered at a rate close to 40 
percent from 1993-1997 to reduce its allowance for loan losses by $100 million”. According to 
Keeley & Ryan (2013), Sun Trust bank was not an outlier for that time period in context of over-
reserving. Moreover, SEC promulgated Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB 102) in July 2001. On 
the same day, FFIEC came up with similar guidance for financial institution. SAB 102 
emphasized on systematic methodology for loan loss allowance and on consistent application of 
this methodology and on documentation of the results of this methodology.  
2.5 Economic factors 
Economic factors are responsible for the fluctuation of the quality of loan portfolio. When the 
economy is doing good; the expectation of the credit loss is very low. So there should be a 
negative relationship between the loan loss provisions and GDP growth. This is known as pro-
cyclical behaviour. For example, Bikker & Hu (2002) utilizes sample period form 1979-1999 
over 26 countries to investigate lending behaviour and provisioning across the countries. They 
find that in bad times of the economy, banks make more provision and good time they find banks 
to reverse the situation. But this pro-cyclical behaviour is mitigated by the discretionary 
behaviour of bank management. As in good times, bank make more profit, they set aside a 
portion of profit for the bad times. Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) investigates cyclical behaviour 
on provisioning. They consider 29 OECD countries over the period from 1991 to 2001. They 
find that when GDP rises, provisioning reduces. They also argue that pro-cyclicality is reduced 
by the “earning” effect. They attributed this earning effect to either income smoothening or 
dynamic provisioning. Literature shows that banks profit pro-cyclicality comes from economic 
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situation of the country. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) investigates the relationship between 
bank profitability and business cycle by analysing the data for 10 countries over the period 1981-
2003. They argue that banks profitability pro-cyclicality derives from net interest income, 
provisioning and that economic cycle exerts influence on profit by net interest income and 
provisioning primarily. They find that profit pro-cyclicality of economy is channelled through 
net interest income and loan loss provisioning.  
2.6 Capital ratio 
Literature regarding the capital ratio should be analysed in the light of significant regulatory 
change in 1989. Before 1989, the capital ratio was calculated, broadly, shareholder’s equity plus 
loan loss allowance divided the total assets. After 1989, capital is segregated into tier I capital 
and tier II capital; loan loss allowance is no more considered for primary capital which is the tier 
I capital after regulatory change. Loan loss allowance is now part of the tier II capital. Before 
regulatory change, bank can increase the capital ratio by increasing the loan loss allowance. But 
the consequence was that bank’s profit reduced on increasing the loan loss provision. Regulatory 
change, however, makes the situation opposite. Now if the bank increases the loan loss 
allowance, profit and capital ratio both will be reduced. As loan loss allowance reduces the 
profit, the process implies the reduction of the retained earning that is a part of shareholders’ 
equity. Moyer (1990) studies capital adequacy ratio before the regulatory change. He found a 
significant negative relation between loan loss provision and capital ratio among the bank with 
less than minimum regulatory requirement.  Kim & Kross (1998) documented the change of the 
regulatory effect on capital management. They considered bank with low capital ratio and bank 
with high capital ratio. They found that the low capital ratio banks are reducing their loan loss 
provision after regulatory change. Same type of result is documented in Ahmed et al. (1999) 
about the regulatory impact on capital management.  
2.7 Size 
Moyer (1994) argues that larger bank might face greater scrutiny from the regulatory body for 
larger profit. These banks bear political cost for not complying the rules and regulations.  So 
these banks have incentive to reduce the earnings. She predicted a positive relationship between 
size and loan loss provision; but found a negative relationship between these two variables. 
Bishop (1996) offers “too big to fail” hypothesis which advocates that regulators are not inclined 
to intervene to activities of large bank, implying an insignificant coefficient for the relationship 
between size and provisioning. Kim and Kross (1998) conclude positive relationship between 
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size and provision. So empirical finding for the relationship between provisioning and size is 
ambiguous. 
2.7 Tax rate 
Merz and Overesch (2014) investigate the tax sensitivity of multinational banks. They collect 
data from Bankscope  Database over the period of 2001 to 2012. Their sample size consists of 
2136 multinational banks groups located in 131 countries. They find that higher tax rate of host 
country will reduce the profit of the subsidiary banks. They also find that trading gains are more 
tax sensitive than other interest bearing activities. They find that host courntry’s higher tax rate 
contribute to more provisioning for the banks.  
2.8 Noninterest income 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) investigates whether fee based income increases the volatility in 
banks earnings. They observe this phenomenon among US commercial banks for a period from 
1988 to 1995. They find that fee based income increases the earning variability for banks.  
Overall, the earnings of banks have increased when they engage in fee based income. DeYoung 
and Rice (2004) investigates the conditions that are conducive to generate noninterest income. 
Their sample includes urban US commercial banks over a period of 1989 to 2001.They find that 
large banks normally generate noninterest income. They also mention that noninterest income is 
associated with increased profit and more variability in profit. Mamun, Meier and Wilson (2012) 
observed the relationship between noninterest income and banking performance over a period 
from 2003 to 2012. They find that noninterest income increases bank performance. They also 
argue that noninterest activity does not worsen bank performance during the crisis. From the 
analysis, it can be shown that noninterest income is very important earning tool for the banking 
industry.  
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3.0 Hypotheses 
Banks prefer to maintain a consistent level of loan loss allowance to avoid investigation from 
different regulators. Below is the general equation for loan loss allowance. 
                                                                                   
In equation 3.1, 
All= Allowance for loan and lease losses 
Pll= Provision for loan and lease losses 
Rec= Recovery of charged off loans 
Glco= Gross loan charge off  
Here, if one year recovery or provision is higher, charge off should be higher as well to make the 
allowance stable. Banks smooth income prolonged horizon by utilizing the charge off (Liu and 
Ryan, 2006). Moreover, banks need to make continuous adjustment in charge off and recovery to 
avoid an unintended attention from regulatory authorities.  
As discussed earlier, untimely provision for loan and lease losses reserve for above-median 
heterogeneous loan carries information for market (Liu and Ryan, 1995). This untimely 
recognition was a good news for the investors as it implies that bank management are making 
more provision using discretionary power to absorb the unexpected hit from economy.  Liu and 
Ryan (1995) find this behaviour over a period of 1983 to 1991. However this behaviour have 
been changed in 90s economic boom as documented in Liu and Ryan (2006). It is found that 
homogenous loans are associated with loan loss provision for more profitable bank than 
heterogeneous loan are. During 90s booming period, US banking industry was utilizing a unique 
mechanism to smooth income, a mechanism which allows them to charge off more in current 
year and subsequently recover in next year (Liu and Ryan, 2006).  After the Sun Trust Banks’ 
case, new regulatory measures were imposed to provide more transparency in loan loss 
accounting. FFIFC comes up with the strict regulations in 1999, which addresses few concerns of 
the policy applied since 1980. These stricter regulations give bank management less incentive to 
charge off of homogenous loan. As a result, we expect that discretionary behaviour in 
provisioning might change after policy change in 1999. As provision for heterogeneous loan is 
made based on judgement, banks may focus on heterogeneous loan rather than on homogenous 
loan to continue their income smoothing process. As such, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Profitable BHC will continue to smooth income even after policy change. 
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Hypothesis 1b: After policy change in 1999, the association between provisioning and 
heterogeneous loans will be stronger for profitable BHC.  
Another mention worthy issue is the banks’ income source. Apart from traditional interest 
income, banks generate noninterest income. After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 
banks are open for broad noninterest activities. DeYoung and Rice(2004) mention that over 40% 
of the operating income of the U.S. Commercial banking industry is generated from noninterest 
income in U.S. commercial banking industry. Moreover, DeYoung and Roland (2001) find that 
diversification of income in noninterest activities increases the earning volatility for the banks. 
So these kinds of noninterest income increase the riskiness of the bank. Therefore, the bank 
might build a safety buffer through provisioning. Based on this, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1c: Provisioning will be associated with noninterest income for profitable BHC. 
There were two important regulatory changes in very short period of time for US banking 
industry in late 90s and beginning of 2001, which might have an effect in charge off of different 
kind of loans. In 1999, FFIEC’s policy regarding the charge off homogenous loan was not new. 
This policy made charge off of different types of homogenous loan stricter and this policy was 
comprehensive to capture changes in the riskiness of the consumer loans. The policy regarding 
charge off homogenous loan before the revised policy by FFIEC in 1999 was flexible. Before 
this change banks could charge off homogenous loans between the periods between 120 to 240 
days. However, in revised policy, bank need to charge off open end credit at 180 days past due 
and closed-end credit at 120 days past due.  After SunTrust Bank’s case, FFIEC makes this 
proposal to restrict charge off of homogenous loan. It would be exaggeration to claim that this 
policy will stop the discretionary part of charge off of homogenous loan. But it could be 
expected that regulatory oversight will increase over charge off of homogenous loan after this 
policy change. We propose that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Following the policy change in 1999 by FFIEC the lead lag relationship between 
charge off of homogenous loans in the past year and recovery in the current year is expected to 
be weakened. 
In 2001, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues guideline for loan loss allowance 
methodology that is known as Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB 102). FFIEC also comes up with 
similar kind of guideline in same time period. This regulation requires that loan loss allowance 
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be made systematic way, applied consistently and methodology have to be documented. Though 
this regulation is for all kinds of loan, heterogeneous loan might be affected more. In background 
information of SAB 102, it is mentioned that “Some registrants assured the staff that they had 
assessed significant loans individually for impairment, but could not produce documentation 
demonstrating how the loans were evaluated or how any loan impairment was measured. In other 
cases, registrants' internal documentation indicating that a particular loan was impaired could not 
be reconciled with management's ultimate decision not to provide for any loss on that loan. 
Several registrants that recorded loan loss allowances for pools of loans did not maintain 
documentation indicating how the amounts of the loan loss allowances were determined or how 
the amounts related to the composition of the loan pool at any particular balance sheet date.” So 
when regulatory authority is concerned with individual loans, it necessarily indicates that these 
guidelines will impose some restriction on making discretionary provisioning from 
heterogeneous loan. Moreover, Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) find that the association 
between allowance and future charge off is stronger after the guidance of SAB 102. So 
provisioning carries information for the future loss. Then future charge off carries less 
discretionary element than before the guidance of SAB 102. Based on this fact, we propose that:  
Hypothesis 2b: Following the policy change in 2001 by SEC/FFIEC the lead lag relationship 
between charge off of heterogeneous loans in the past year and recovery in the current year is 
expected to be weakened. 
As described earlier, banks have less incentive to make charge off of loan this year, which 
eventually recovers next year. It implies that regulation creates obstacles to smooth income by 
charge off. In this situation, banks might be in trouble if they recover more, making huge 
allowance account. Banks can make more charge off of in current year if banks recover 
unexpectedly to make the allowance account stable. Though it is counterintuitive with the 
previous hypothesis, it would be sheer exaggeration to claim that new policy will stop 
discretionary charge off completely. Bank management always has an option to charge off 
though new policy should weaken the abnormal charge off that was observed in 90s economic 
boom.  Based on this situation, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3a: The policy change in 1999 by FFIEC strengthens the association between current 
year recovery from homogenous loan and current year gross loan charge off for profitable BHC.  
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Hypothesis 3b: The policy change in 2001 by SEC/FFIEC strengthens the association between 
current year recovery from heterogeneous loan and current year gross loan charge off for 
profitable BHC. 
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4.0 Data and Variable Definition 
Though FFIEC gave final notice related with charge off on 10th February, 1999, the full 
implementation of this policy went into effect from 2000 due to flexibility given to changes in 
computer programing related to policy changes. It is possible that banks adopted this regulation 
in different years. Some banks might have implemented in year 1999 and others in year 2000. To 
avoid this noise, we have not considered the data for the year 1999 and 2000.  So we consider 
before policy change regime is 1991-1998 and after policy change regime is 2001-2013. We 
consider only bank holding companies which hold asset more than 500 million. There are two 
reasons to choose BHCs who hold consolidated asset 500 million or more. FDICIA’s internal 
control regulations are applicable for the banks which holds asset more than 500 million. 
Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find that this internal control regulation has improved the reporting 
quality of the financial statements.  Greater association between provisions for loan losses  and 
loan charge offs, persistence earning, reduced earning management, improvement in cash 
predictability are documented in Altamuro and Beatty (2010) for banks which are under internal 
control regulation of FDICIA. Moreover, we collect data from Fed Form FR Y-9C Regulatory 
filing database. Reporting obligations for BHC has changed various times. Before 2006, BHCs 
which hold total consolidated assets $150 million or more need to report using FR Y-9C; after 
2006, those which hold total consolidated assets $500 million or more need to be reported. Based 
on internal control regulation and reporting requirement, we have considered only those banks 
which report consolidated assets $500 million or more.  
Another issue is that bank behaviour varies based on strong banks and weak banks. Different 
literatures define weak and strong based on capital ratios or earnings before provision or return 
on assets.  Banking industry is differentiated based on size, growth or profitability, which is 
implied in Collins et al. (1995). Increase in loan loss provision is related positively with stock 
market return for only at risk bank, documented in Liu et al. (1997). Here, they define “at risk” 
banks which have below median primary capital ratio in sample size. Again Liu and Ryan (2006) 
find that more profitable banks, holding more homogeneous loan, are associated with income 
smoothening through loan loss provision during 90s booming period.  Here, they define more 
profitable banks as banks that have above median return on assets. Narayanamoorthy and Beck 
(2013) find that allowance of strong bank has greater association with past charge-offs than those 
of weak bank. Here, they define weak and strong based on earnings and capital ratios. Consistent 
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with this literature we consider banks with above median profitability (measured by return on 
asset) in any given year we also windsorize data at .05% to address the outlier problem. 
We follow Liu and Ryan (2006) in constructing our variables. They used annual frequency in 
their study. We collect quarterly data; for balance sheet item, we take last quarter’s value and for 
income statement items, we take average of four quarters and multiply it by four to annualize the 
data. To track the economic boom and bust, we collect business cycle data from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). All the variables used in this study are defined in 
appendix. 
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5.0 Methodology 
As hypothesized, we posit that banks’ provision for loan and lease losses is positively associated 
with income before provision for loan and lease losses. We also expect that this income 
smoothing behaviour is stronger for more profitable banks that hold more heterogeneous loan 
after policy change. As discussed, policy changes in 1999 leads us to hypothesize that provision 
for loan and lease losses should be more associated with heterogeneous loan. This expectation is 
opposite of what is observed by Liu and Ryan (2006). To test our conjecture we use a model 
very similar to the specification of Liu and Ryan (2006). We use dummy variable to identify the 
policy change. We interact the dummy variables and other variables to observe the effect of 
change after policy. Our sample period is much longer than any other study which captures 
several business cycles. Previous literatures find that economic condition impact bank 
profitability through provision for loan and lease losses.  In our model, we use NBER’s business 
cycle dummy to control economic condition.  Moreover, we add net loan charge off and recovery 
in our model. As mentioned earlier, allowance for loan and lease losses is the function of 
provision for current year, charge off and recovery. So provision for loan and lease losses is not 
independent of loan charge off and recovery. It depends on how much loan charge off and 
recovery occurs in current year. Kim and Kross (1998) also include loan write off in their model 
to estimate the provision for loan and lease losses. They also include size in their model to 
control any kind of political bias. As we work with only the higher return generating banks, we 
don’t do any interactions terms for more profitable banks as Liu and Ryan (2006) have done. As 
such the model is used to test the presence of income smoothing behaviour: 
                          [         ]  [               ]              
                                                                 
This above model is used to measure the effect of policy change. In this equation, Pllt is the 
provision for loan and lease losses, xt is the net income before provision for loan and lease losses, 
het_pert is the percentage of heterogeneous loan, policy is  a dummy variable to capture policy 
change (it is 0 before the policy change and 1 after the policy change), cap1t is the tier 1 capital 
ratio, dnpat is the changes in non-performing loans, nlcot is the gross loan charge off net of 
recovery, rect is the recovery, sizet is the log of total assets, rnonintert is the noninterest income, 
contractt(expanst) is a dummy following the NBER business cycle to capture contraction 
(expansion) of the economy. As hypothesized, we expect test three main hypothesis using the 
above model after policy change. First, we expect positive association between both xt and pllt, 
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indicating the presence of income smoothing behaviour. We also expect a positive association 
between [xt*policy] and Pllt , indicating the existence of income smoothing behaviour even after 
policy change. Second, we expect positive association between [het_pert*policy] and pllt, 
indicating that banks, holding more heterogeneous loans, have more incentive to smooth income 
after policy change. Third, we expect positive association between noninterest income 
(rnonintert) and provisioning (Pllt).  
We expect other control variable will be consistent with previous literatures. Cap1 should be 
negatively associated with provisioning as documented in Liu and Ryan (2006) and Ahmed et al. 
(1999). We expect a positive sign between charge off and provision for loan losses as charge off 
goes up, provisioning should increase to avoid regulators attention of ballooned allowance for 
loan and lease account. Kim and Kross (1998) uses loan write off in their model to estimate 
provision for loan and lease losses. As by construction, charge off should have a positive 
association with provisioning and negative association with recovery to make a stable allowance 
for loan and lease account. According to previous literature, we expect a positive sign for size of 
the banks.  
The first model is used to judge the presence of income smoothing; the next two models are 
developed to substantiate the results of equation 1. As charge off policy from FFIEC gives less 
incentive for bank management to charge off of homogenous loan, we predict that charge off 
behaviour might shift to heterogeneous loans after policy change. The following model captures 
the continuous process of income smoothing to give allowance a stable look. Liu and Ryan 
(2006) use this model in prolonged 90s booming period. We have followed Liu and Ryan’s 
(2006) model with few modifications 
                                                 [                  ]  
[                  ]                                              
                                                          
In this equation, rect is the recovery of the charged off of loan, het_pert is the heterogeneous loan 
of the bank’s loan composition, policy is a dummy variable to capture policy change,glco_homt-1 
is the gross loan charge off of homogenous loan, glco_hett-1 is the lagged gross loan charge off of 
heterogeneous loan, cap1t-1 is the lagged capital ratio, dnpat is the changes in non-performing 
loan, dnpat-1 is the lagged changes in non-performing loan, dnpat-2 is the two year lagged 
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changes in non-performing loan, dnpat-3 is the three year lagged changes in non-performing loan, 
sizet is the log of total assets, rnonintert is the noninterest income, contract(expans)t is a dummy 
following the NBER business cycle to capture contraction(expansion) of the economy. In this 
model, we predict that policy might have impact on charge off policy of bank management. Liu 
and Ryan (2006) find that previous year charged off is substantially recovered in current year. 
This behaviour was intensive for more profitable bank, holding more homogenous loan in 90s 
prolonged economic boom. New regulation for charge off policy has few significant changes. 
Banks could charge off of homogenous loan from 120 days to 240 days before the regulatory 
change. Under the new policy regime, banks need to charge off of open end credit within 180 
days of past due payments and of closed end credit at 120 days of past due payments. Open end 
credit indicates a pre-approved loan between financial institution and borrower. The pre 
specified amount of loan must be paid off within specified date to continue the loan agreement. 
Credit card falls into this category. Closed end credit indicates a loan that is provided at the 
beginning of the loan agreement. But the principal amount and financing charge must be paid off 
within specified time. Auto loans fall into this category. This restriction makes it difficult for 
bank management to charge off homogenous loan arbitrarily, which eventually could be 
recovered next year. In this context, our conjecture is that bank management might have less 
incentive to charge off homogenous loan. So in this context, we expect after policy change loan 
charged off of homogenous loans might be reduced. The coefficient of [glco_homt-1*policy] 
should be negative after policy change.  However, Ryan (2007) also argues that in rapidly 
fluctuating economic conditions, loan officers might make mistakes to estimate the loan default 
for heterogeneous loan even though loan officers don’t have any discretionary intention. We also 
expect that past charged off from heterogeneous loan might have negative and significant 
relationship with recoveries. It might be due to stricter regulations for documentation of the 
methodology of loan loss allowance account, implemented in 2001. We expect that policy in 
2001 will effect more to provisioning of heterogeneous loan rather than that of homogenous 
loan.  The coefficient [glco_hett-1*policy] should be negative. Similar to our previous model 
specification, we also control for economic condition and the size effect.  
In next model, we will try to show that banks recovered more loan in current year, charge off 
more loan in current year to have a stable allowance account. This model captures a single year 
manipulation unlike dynamic income manipulation that can be captured in equation 2.  
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                                           [               ]  
[              ]                                         
                                                     
This model tests the association between recovery of different loan composition and gross loan 
charge off.  We expect that recovery from heterogeneous loan will have an association with gross 
loan charge off even after policy change. Though policy might impact the lead lag relationship of 
the charge off and recovery, current year relationship between recovery and charge off should 
continue. As hypothesized in equation 1, banks will continue their smoothing behaviour. To do 
so, banks need to charge off if they recover more from different loan composition to keep 
allowance account stable. So the coefficient of [rec_hett*policy] and [rec_hett*policy] will be 
positive.  We have also controlled the other factors as documented in Liu and Ryan (2006). Ryan 
(2007) argues that provision for loan losses is the estimation of credit losses. So when economy 
goes in recession, banks make more provision which might be defaulted in next year. He also 
mentions that charge off is the realization of the credit losses during the period. So charge off 
might be associated with the lagged economic conditions. So we used lagged economic 
indicators, creating dummy variable following business cycle defined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  We have controlled size of the bank to control the strength of the banks. 
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6.0 Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study for two sample period 
i.e. before policy change and after policy change. Average profit has declined from period 1991-
1998 to 2001- 2013 and the decrease (approximately 16%) of the profit is statistically significant. 
On average, Size of the banks between these two period reduced by almost 1%, which is 
statistically significant. Recessionary period after policy change might have contributed to shrink 
the size of the bank. 
It is found that allowance for loan and lease losses has reduced by approximately 22%. Though 
economy has experienced bust and boom in the period 2001 to 2013, it is counter intuitive to 
have a reduced loan and lease losses allowance. Provision for loan and lease losses remains 
almost unchanged between these two periods. Overall, gross loan charge off also significantly 
declined by approximately 4%. But gross loan charge off of homogenous loan has decreased by 
approximately 5% while gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan has not changed. Recovery, 
however, has reduced by almost 46%. Recovery from both homogenous and heterogeneous loan 
has decreased by approximately 41% and 54% respectively. Compared to period from 1991 to 
1998, banks might have been cautious about gross loan charge off especially for homogenous 
loan. Gross loan charge off for homogenous loan reduces between these two periods, so does 
recovery of homogenous loan. This might have been due to strict regulations from bank 
authorities or strict oversight of existing banking regulations. However, the behaviour of gross 
loan charge off and recovery of heterogeneous loan is not same. Between these two time periods, 
the gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan has not changed but the recovery of same loan 
has decreased.  During 2001-2013, two recessionary periods (2001 and 2008-2009) might have 
had an impact on gross charge off of heterogeneous loan. Ryan (2007) has argued that in rapidly 
changing economic situation, banks’ judgment for heterogeneous loan could be wrong.  The 
situation of net loan charge off overtime is shown in figure 6.1. It is obvious that the net loan 
charge off from homogenous loan has been decreased after policy change. Moreover, in figure 
6.2, it is found that ratio of recovery to gross loan charge off has reduced over the years.  
 
Homogenous loan and heterogeneous loans show exact opposite trend before and after policy 
change. While homogenous loan decreases by approximately 37% between these two periods, 
heterogeneous loan increases by 23%. On the other hand, changes in non-performing loan have 
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increased by 220% between these two periods. Ryan (2007) argues that non-performing loan is 
better benchmark for future loan default of large, heterogeneous loan. So we can infer that 
increase in heterogeneous loan is contributing more in changes in non-performing loans. Two 
recessionary periods i.e. 2001 and 2008-2009 might have contributed to the non-performing 
loan. This non-performing loan might have impacted the provision for the period, which 
eventually causes to reduce the profit. 
Correlation matrixes among variables are shown in table 6.2 and table 6.3 before policy change 
and after policy change respectively. There is no significant change in relationship among the 
variables before and after policy change. 
6.2 Regression Results 
Table 6.4 documents the fixed firm effect estimation of equation 5.1. As hypothesized, the 
coefficient of Xt is positive and significant in all different specifications, consistent with previous 
results documented in Wahlen (1994), Collins (1995), and Liu and Ryan (2006). But the 
interaction term between the Xt and policy (X_policy) is not significant. Which suggests the 
presence of income smoothing continues even after policy change. We expect that due to stricter 
policy on provisioning of homogenous loan, banks might have shifted to more provisioning 
through heterogeneous loans. Contrary to our expectation we find no change in association 
between percentage of heterogeneous loan and provision after policy change. 
As hypothesized, we also find a significant association between noninterest income and 
provisioning3. This result is consistent with the idea of DeYoung and Roland (2001) and 
DeYoung and Rice (2004). As fee based income increases the variability of the earning, bank 
management may try to make cushion for this risk through provisioning.  
We find, contractt has a positive relationship with provision for loan and lease losses in column 
(1) and column (2). Expanst has a negative relationship with provision for loan and lease losses 
in column (3) and column (4). This conforms the pro cyclical behaviour of provisioning, 
consistent to results of Bikker and Hu (2002) and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009).Other 
control variables are consistent with previous literature. Capital ratio has a significant negative 
association with provision for loan and lease losses, consistent with results of Moyer (1994) and 
Ahmed et al. (1999). Change in non-performing loan is significantly associated with provision 
for loan and lease losses, consistent with results of Ahmed et al (1999). Consistent with results of 
                                                          
3
 We observe this relationship between provisioning and noninterest income over the period of 2001 to 2013. This 
result holds for this subsample also.  
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Kim and Kross (1998), nlcot has a significant positive association with provisioning. As 
expected, recovery (Rect) has an opposite sign of net loan charge off. Sizet is negatively related 
with provision though statistically insignificant, consistent with results of Moyer (1994).  Ryan 
(2007) argues that non-performing loan is better benchmark of credit losses for large and 
heterogeneous loan that might be charged off using judgement. So as economy goes through 
cycle non-performing asset should increase and decrease. One should expect higher 
nonperforming asset when the economy is in a contraction and opposite in expansion. As 
opposed to this expectation, we find insignificant results in column (2) and column (4) of table 
6.4 for the interaction term dnpacontra (interaction between dnpa and contraction) and 
dnpaexpan (interaction between dnpa and expansion) respectively.  
Though the literature shows a relationship between the tax rate and provisioning, we do not 
control for tax rate for few reasons. First, we use a year dummy in our study. So the variability of 
tax rate could be captured by the year dummy. Second, we control for the firm fixed effect. This 
control might capture the variation in tax rates among the firms.Third, Dyreng et al. (2014) 
observe that the effective tax rates have decreased over the last twenty five year periods from 
1988-2012 U.S. They observe this phenomenon for a sample of 54,005 U. S firm-years. 
Therefore, the tax rate might have not impacted smoothing income as the effective tax rate has 
declined over a long time period.    
From the first model (table 6.4), it is evident that income smoothing behaviour does not change 
even after policy change. But to substantiate this result we need to observe the other components 
of allowance for loan and lease losses. Those two models are discussed as follows.  
Table 6.5 estimates firm fixed effects model of equation 5.2. We find that previous year charged 
off of homogenous loan is significantly associated with recovery, consistent with results of Liu 
and Ryan (2006). However, after policy change that association between previous year charged 
off homogenous loan (lglco_hompolicy) and recovery (rec) has been reduced significantly. This 
is consistent with our expectation. After regulation changes by FDICIA in 1993 for banks 
holding total assets more than 500 million, Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find that current year 
provision for loan and lease losses have greater association with charged off of next year . This 
implies that provision is made for that part of loans which is more than likely to default. So the 
next year charged off of loans is not discretionary part. This charged off has little chance to 
recover in the following year. That is reflected in our findings. Weakening in association 
29 
  
between previous year charge off of homogenous loan and current year recovery after policy 
change is due to policy change, as discussed, for charge off of homogenous loan.  
 
On the other hand, we find that previous year charge off of heterogeneous loan has a significant 
association with current year recovery, which is consistent with the Liu and Ryan (2006). But as 
opposed to our expectation, this association does not change after the policy change. This implies 
that FFIEC policy in 1999 has had an impact in charge off of homogenous loan which is 
essentially recovered in the next year. It also suggests that SEC/FFIEC policy in 2001 does not 
impact in the behaviour of charge off of heterogeneous loan. Though in 2001, SEC/FFIEC 
implements new documentation policy, banks still can use judgement to make provision and 
charge off of heterogeneous loan. All other variables used in table 6 have similar signs of Liu 
and Ryan (2006). We find a negative sign with economic contraction dummy (contract) though 
not significant. These results are consistent with descriptive statistics
4
 in table 6.1.  
Table 6.6 shows the firm fixed effects estimation of equation 5.3. We find that recovery from 
homogenous loan has a significant association with gross loan charge off, which is consistent 
with the results of Liu and Ryan (2006).  But as opposed to expectation, this relationship does 
not change after policy change. Similarly, recovery from heterogeneous loan has a significant 
association with gross loan charge off. However, the interaction term between policy and 
recovery from heterogeneous loan is positive and significant. This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis that after policy change recovery from heterogeneous loan is associated with gross 
loan charge off. This result is different from what is observed by Liu and Ryan (2006) in terms 
of recovery of heterogeneous loan. They find no significant association with recovery of 
heterogeneous loan and gross loan charge off.  It suggests that bank management has shifted its 
behaviour in income smoothing process after policy change.  We find no significant change in 
                                                          
4 We find that net loan charge off of homogenous loan has significantly declined after policy change. We can infer 
from analysis that the intended effect of policy change has been achieved. Policy has reduced the arbitrary rule of 
fast charge off policy among banks in 90s booming period. On the other hand, we find that net loan charge off of 
heterogeneous loan has increased after policy change. But this increment of charged off of heterogeneous loan does 
not show any association with recovery. It necessarily suggests that charged off of heterogeneous loan is not the 
discretionary behaviour of bank management but the reflection of economic conditions that force bank management 
to charge off of heterogeneous loan.  
 
30 
  
association between recovery of homogenous loan and gross loan charge off after policy change. 
Restrictive nature of the policy makes charge off of homogenous loan difficult. It implies that 
bank charges off that part of a loan that is essentially not recoverable. All other variables show 
consistent results with Liu and Ryan (2006) except capital (cap1). 
  
  
  
3
1 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables: Before Policy Change Vs after Policy Change 
This table reports mean, median, minimum and maximum value of different variables that are used in different analysis of this study. In last column, 
t-statistics is given for the significance difference in the means for the two periods. “***” indicates significance level at 0.01. X represents for 
provision for loan and lease losses. PLL represents for provision for loan and lease losses. GLCO stands for gross loan charge off. GLCO_HOM 
stands for gross loan charge off homogenous loan. GLCO_HET stands for gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan. NLCO represents gross loan 
charge off net of recovery of charged off loan. NLCO_HOM represents gross loan charge off of homogenous loan net of recovery of charged off 
homogenous loan. NLCO_HET represents gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan net of recovery of charged off heterogeneous loan. REC 
stands for recovery of charged off loan. REC_HOM represents for recovery of charged off homogeneous loan. REC_HET represents for recovery of 
charged off heterogeneous loan. ALL stands for allowance for loan and lease losses. DNPA represents changes in non-performing loan. HOM_PER 
and HET_PER defined in details sample and variable definition section. SIZE is the log of total assets. RNONINTER stands for noninterest income.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before Policy Change(1991-1998) After Policy Change(2001-2013)  
Variables N Mean Sd Min Max N Mean Sd Min Max t-statistics(Mean 
Difference) 
X 1830 0.1159 0.0371 0.028 0.449 5248 0.0965 0.0265 0.014 0.501 20.6109*** 
Pll 1830 0.0129 0.0167 -0.055 0.176 5248 0.0127 0.0223 -0.029 0.556 0.4023 
Glco 1830 0.0157 0.0182 0.000 0.170 5248 0.0132 0.0248 0.000 0.555 4.5781*** 
Glco_hom 1830 0.0087 0.0149 0.000 0.149 5248 0.0062 0.0219 0.000 0.555 5.4206*** 
Glco_het 1830 0.0064 0.0077 0.000 0.082 5248 0.0063 0.0083 0.000 0.092 0.4687 
Nlco 1830 0.0107 0.0155 -0.039 0.155 5248 0.0105 0.0214 -0.013 0.494 0.4278 
Nlco_hom 1830 0.0065 0.0128 -0.006 0.133 5248 0.0049 0.0186 -0.002 0.494 4.0581*** 
Nlco_het 1830 0.0038 0.0068 -0.034 0.057 5248 0.0051 0.0077 -0.012 0.088 -6.7984*** 
Rec 1830 0.0050 0.0058 0.000 0.073 5248 0.0027 0.0044 0.000 0.064 15.4814*** 
Rec_hom 1830 0.0022 0.0026 0.000 0.024 5248 0.0013 0.0033 0.000 0.064 11.8492*** 
Rec_het 1830 0.0026 0.0039 0.000 0.057 5248 0.0012 0.0021 0.000 0.034 14.6344*** 
All 1830 0.0214 0.0129 0.003 0.191 5248 0.0165 0.0086 0.002 0.200 15.1198*** 
Dnpa 1830 0.0005 0.0090 -0.040 0.117 5246 0.0016 0.0116 -0.114 0.128 -4.1602*** 
Hom_per 1830 0.5742 0.2843 0.000 2.993 5248 0.3607 0.2072 0.000 1.904 29.5085*** 
Het_per 1830 0.5819 0.3113 0.003 5.409 5248 0.7145 0.2486 0.006 2.361 -16.4811*** 
Size 1830 14.7164 1.3239 13.127 18.713 5248 14.4818 1.4186 13.125 21.024 6.4058*** 
Rnoninter 1830 0.1607 0.1079 0.020 0.861 5248 0.2036 0.1362 -0.010 0.970 -13.6368*** 
index 1830 0.1248 0.3643 -0.610 0.620 5248 -0.3540 0.6962 -1.910 0.330 37.2881*** 
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Figure 6.1: NLCO of Homogenous loan and Heterogeneous loan before and after policy 
change 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Ratio of recovery to gross loan charge off of loan 
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix among variables-Before policy change (1991-1998) 
First table shows correlation matrix among the variables before policy change and second table shows correlation matrix among the variables after 
policy change. The symbols “***”, “**” , “*” denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. X represents for provision 
for loan and lease losses. PLL represents for provision for loan and lease losses. GLCO stands for gross loan charge off. LGLCO stands for lagged gross 
loan charge off. GLCO_HOM stands for gross loan charge off homogenous loan. GLCO_HET stands for gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan. 
NLCO represents gross loan charge off net of recovery of charged off loan. NLCO_HOM represents gross loan charge off of homogenous loan net of 
recovery of charged off homogenous loan. NLCO_HET represents gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan net of recovery of charged off 
heterogeneous loan. REC stands for recovery of charged off loan. REC_HOM represents for recovery of charged off homogeneous loan. REC_HET 
represents for recovery of charged off heterogeneous loan. ALL stands for allowance for loan and lease losses. DNPA represents changes in non-
performing loan. RNONINTER stands for noninterest income.HOM_PER and HET_PER defined in details in appendix. 
 x pll glco lglco glco_ho
m 
glco_het nlco nlco_ho
m 
nlco_het rec rec_hom rec_het all dnpa hom_per het_per Size 
X 
1 
               
 
Pll 
0.51*** 1 
              
 
Glco 
0.51*** 0.84*** 1 
             
 
Lglco 
0.33*** 0.62*** 0.77*** 1 
            
 
glco_hom 
0.51*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 0.74*** 1 
           
 
glco_het 
0.12*** 0.20*** 0.41*** 0.20*** -0.01 1 
          
 
Nlco 
0.50*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 0.71*** 0.88*** 0.37*** 1 
         
 
nlco_hom 
0.51*** 0.85*** 0.88*** 0.72*** 0.99*** -0.01 0.89*** 1 
        
 
nlco_het 
0.11*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.15*** 0.01 0.87*** 0.45*** 0.01 1 
       
 
Rec 
0.30*** 0.32*** 0.61*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.29*** 0.40*** 0.45*** -0.02 1 
      
 
rec_hom 
0.43*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.66*** 0.84*** 0.01 0.67*** 0.78*** -0.02 0.66*** 1 
     
 
rec_het 
0.02 -0.18*** 0.10*** 0.14*** -0.05* 0.34*** 
-
0.12*** -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.65*** 0.07*** 1 
    
 
All 
0.34*** 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.63*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 1 
   
 
Dnpa 
0.27*** 0.18*** 0.16*** -0.06** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.24*** 0.09*** -0.01 0.37*** 1 
  
 
hom_per 
0.38*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.36*** -0.12*** 0.27*** 0.35*** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.35*** -0.12*** 0.10*** 0.26*** 1 
 
 
het_per 
0.16*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.22*** -0.30*** 0.32*** 
-
0.18*** -0.30*** 0.20*** 0.08*** -0.24*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.26*** -0.38*** 1  
Size 
0.04* 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.15*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 0 0.14*** -0.08*** 1 
Rnoninter -
0.169**
* 
0.197**
* 
0.293**
* 
0.318**
* 0.29*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.28*** -0.01 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.09*** 0.15*** -0.03 0.04* -0.13*** 
0.36**
* 
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Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix among variables-after policy change (2001-2013) 
First table shows correlation matrix among the variables after policy change and second table shows correlation matrix among the variables after policy 
change. The symbols “***”, “**” , “*” denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. X represents for provision for loan 
and lease losses. PLL represents for provision for loan and lease losses. GLCO stands for gross loan charge off. LGLCO stands for lagged gross loan 
charge off. GLCO_HOM stands for gross loan charge off homogenous loan. GLCO_HET stands for gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan. NLCO 
represents gross loan charge off net of recovery of charged off loan. NLCO_HOM represents gross loan charge off of homogenous loan net of recovery 
of charged off homogenous loan. NLCO_HET represents gross loan charge off of heterogeneous loan net of recovery of charged off heterogeneous loan. 
REC stands for recovery of charged off loan. REC_HOM represents for recovery of charged off homogeneous loan. REC_HET represents for recovery 
of charged off heterogeneous loan. ALL stands for allowance for loan and lease losses. DNPA represents changes in non-performing loan. 
RNONINTER stands for noninterest income. HOM_PER and HET_PER defined in details in appendix. 
 X Pll Glco lglco glco_ho
m 
glco_het Nlco nlco_ho
m 
nlco_het Rec rec_ho
m 
rec_het All Dnpa hom_per het_per Size 
X 
1 
               
 
Pll 
0.47*** 1 
              
 
Glco 
0.46*** 0.90*** 1 
             
 
Lglco 
0.48*** 0.72*** 0.83*** 1 
            
 
glco_ho
m 0.53*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 1 
           
 
glco_het 
-0.01 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 1 
          
 
Nlco 
0.45*** 0.92*** 0.99*** 0.80*** 0.88*** 0.44*** 1 
         
 
nlco_ho
m 0.53*** 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.99*** 0.05*** 0.89*** 1 
        
 
nlco_het 
-0.01 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.96*** 0.45*** 0.06*** 1 
       
 
Rec 
0.40*** 0.54*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.22*** 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.08*** 1 
      
 
rec_hom 
0.51*** 0.69*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.88*** 0 0.74*** 0.85*** 0 0.79*** 1 
     
 
rec_het 
0.02 0 0.16*** 0.13*** 0 0.39*** 0.07*** 0 0.16*** 0.56*** 0.03** 1 
    
 
All 
0.44*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.28*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.23*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.25*** 1 
   
 
Dnpa 
0.06*** 0.12*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.01 0 
-
0.15*** -0.03** -0.21*** 0 1 
  
 
hom_per 
0.09*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.32*** -0.15*** 0.21*** 0.31*** -0.14*** 0.23*** 0.36*** -0.09*** 0.10*** 0.03** 1 
 
 
het_per 
0.16*** 
-
0.18*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.30*** 0.04*** -0.25*** -0.29*** 0.01 
-
0.21*** 
-
0.33*** 0.09*** 0 
0.12**
* -0.70*** 1  
Size 
-0.11*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0 0.26*** -0.22*** 1 
Rnoninte
r 
-0.16*** 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.07*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.05*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
-
0.06**
* 0.20*** -0.28*** 
0.36*
** 
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Table 6.4: The effect of net interest income before provision for loan and lease losses on 
provision for loan and lease losses after policy change 
Dependent Variables                                      Provision for loan and lease losses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
x 0.0526*** 0.0525*** 0.0526*** 0.0525*** 
 (2.76) (2.78) (2.76) (2.78) 
het_per -0.00113 -0.00114 -0.00113 -0.00114 
 (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.52) 
policy -0.00376* -0.00378* -0.00376* -0.00378* 
 (-1.80) (-1.84) (-1.80) (-1.84) 
x_policy 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) 
het_policy 0.000896 0.000907 0.000896 0.000907 
 (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) 
cap1 -0.0423*** -0.0422*** -0.0423*** -0.0422*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.07) (-3.04) (-3.07) 
dnpa 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
 (6.64) (5.55) (6.64) (4.35) 
nlco 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 
 (13.66) (13.64) (13.66) (13.64) 
rec -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.280*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-2.96) 
size 0.00000835 0.0000107 0.00000835 0.0000107 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
rnoninter 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
 (2.86) (2.82) (2.86) (2.82) 
contract 0.00311*** 0.00312***   
 (8.87) (8.62)   
dnpacontr  -0.00261   
  (-0.06)   
expans   -0.00311*** -0.00312*** 
   (-8.87) (-8.62) 
dnpaexpan    0.00261 
    (0.06) 
Constant 0.00296 0.00294 0.00607 0.00606 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.84) (0.84) 
Observation 7076 7076 7076 7076 
R
2
 0.8427 0.8427 0.8427 0.8427 
1. Table 6.4 reports firm fixed effect regression, estimated for equation 5.1. 
2. The symbols “***”, “**” , “*” denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and in 
parenthesis, white’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are shown. 
3. “X” stands for net interest income before loan and lease losses. “Het_per” stands for heterogeneous loan, explained in 
Appendix. “Policy” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 for the period from 2001 to 2013. “X_policy”stands for 
interaction between “X” and “Policy”. “Het_policy” stands for interaction between “Het_per” and “Policy”. “Cap1” 
stands for tier 1 capital ratio. “Dnpa” stands for changes in non-performing loan. “Nlco” stands for gross loan charge 
off net of recovery. “Rec” stands for recovery of previous charged off loan. “Size” stands for log of total 
assets.”rnoninter” stands for noninterest income. “Contract” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 in recessionary 
period. In my sample, recessionary period is 2001, 2008, & 2009. “Dnpacontr” stands for interaction between “dnpa” 
and contract. “Expans” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 in expansionary period. Expansionary period is all the 
years except recessionary period. “Dnpaexpan” stands for interaction between “dnpa” and “Expans”. 
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Table 6.5: The effect of heterogeneous loan charge off and homogenous loan charge off on 
recovery after policy change 
Dependent Variables Recovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lhet_per 0.00133 0.00161 0.00133 0.000449 
 (0.96) (1.08) (0.96) (0.34) 
policy -0.000773* -0.000830* -0.000773* -0.000830* 
 (-1.77) (-1.85) (-1.77) (-1.85) 
lglco_hom 0.0683*** 0.0697*** 0.0683*** 0.0697*** 
 (2.90) (2.89) (2.90) (2.89) 
lglco_het 0.166* 0.162* 0.166* 0.162* 
 (1.70) (1.65) (1.70) (1.65) 
lglco_hompolicy -0.0574** -0.0582** -0.0574** -0.0582** 
 (-1.97) (-1.99) (-1.97) (-1.99) 
lglco_hetpolicy -0.0945 -0.0898 -0.0945 -0.0898 
 (-0.91) (-0.86) (-0.91) (-0.86) 
lcap1 0.00918 0.00911 0.00918 0.00911 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) 
dnpa -0.0175 -0.0169 -0.0175 -0.0169 
 (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
ldnpa -0.00273 -0.00264 -0.00273 -0.00264 
 (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.28) 
l2dnpa -0.00763 -0.00763 -0.00763 -0.00763 
 (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.42) 
l3dnpa -0.00280 -0.00266 -0.00280 -0.00266 
 (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.23) 
size 0.0000618 0.0000673 0.0000618 0.0000673 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) 
rnoninter 0.00397 0.00401 0.00397 0.00401 
 (1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34) 
contract -0.0000110 0.000789   
 (-0.06) (1.06)   
lhet_contr  -0.00116   
  (-1.10)   
expans   0.0000110 -0.000789 
   (0.06) (-1.06) 
lhet_expan    0.00116 
    (1.10) 
Constant -0.000670 -0.000890 -0.000681 -0.000101 
 (-0.12) (-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.02) 
Observations 3606 3606 3606 3606 
R
2
 0.2236 0.2255 0.2236 0.2255 
1. Table 6.5  reports firm fixed effect regression, estimated for equation 5.2. 
2. The symbols “***”, “**” , “*” denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and in 
parenthesis, white’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are shown. 
3. “lhet_per” stands for lagged variable of heterogeneous loan. “Policy” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 for the 
period from 2001 to 2013. “lglco_hom” stands for lagged variable of gross loan charged off of homogenous loan. 
“lglco_het” stands for lagged variable of gross loan charged off of heterogeneous loan. “lglco_hompolicy” is the 
ineraction between “lglco_hom” and “policy”. “lglco_hetpolicy” is the interaction between “lglco_het” and “policy”. 
“lcap1” is the lagged variable of tier 1 capital ratio. “dnpa” stands for changes in non-performing loan. “ldnpa” stands 
for lagged variable of changes in non-performing loan. “l2dnpa” stands for two year lagged period variable of changes 
in non-performing loan. “l3dnpa” stands for three year lagged period variable of changes in non-performing loan. 
“Size” stands for log of total assets.”rnoninter” stands for noninterest income. “Contract” stands for dummy variable 
that takes 1 in recessionary period. In my sample, recessionary period is 2001, 2008, & 2009. “lhet_contr” is the 
interaction between “lhet_per” and “Contract”. “Expans” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 in expansionary 
period. Expansionary period is all the years except recessionary period. “lhet_expan” is the interaction between 
“lhet_per” and “Expans”. 
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Table 6.6: The effect of recovery of heterogeneous loan and homogenous loan on gross loan 
charge off after policy change. 
Dependent Variables Gross Loan Charge Off 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
het_per -0.00373 -0.00375 -0.00373 -0.00375 
 (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.18) 
policy -0.000728 -0.000678 -0.000728 -0.000678 
 (-0.83) (-0.77) (-0.83) (-0.77) 
rec_hom 1.297*** 1.297*** 1.297*** 1.297*** 
 (4.66) (4.66) (4.66) (4.66) 
rec_het 1.039*** 1.035*** 1.039*** 1.035*** 
 (5.40) (5.34) (5.40) (5.34) 
rec_hompolicy 0.424 0.425 0.424 0.425 
 (1.18) (1.19) (1.18) (1.19) 
rec_hetpolicy 0.618* 0.614* 0.618* 0.614* 
 (1.87) (1.85) (1.87) (1.85) 
cap1 0.0372*** 0.0370*** 0.0372*** 0.0370*** 
 (4.25) (4.18) (4.25) (4.18) 
pll 0.712*** 0.712*** 0.712*** 0.712*** 
 (19.70) (19.61) (19.70) (19.61) 
lall 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 
 (3.07) (3.11) (3.07) (3.11) 
ldnpa 0.0267 0.0171 0.0267 0.0505 
 (1.19) (0.71) (1.19) (1.21) 
size 0.00146*** 0.00142** 0.00146*** 0.00142** 
 (2.62) (2.58) (2.62) (2.58) 
rnoninter 0.00239 0.00229 0.00239 0.00229 
 (0.66) (0.63) (0.66) (0.63) 
lcontr 0.000176 0.0000152   
 (0.53) (0.05)   
ldnpa_lcon  0.0334   
  (0.76)   
lexpan   -0.000176 -0.0000152 
   (-0.53) (-0.05) 
ldnpa_lexp    -0.0334 
    (-0.76) 
Constant -0.0263*** -0.0258*** -0.0261*** -0.0258*** 
 (-4.25) (-4.20) (-4.27) (-4.23) 
Observations 5622 5622 5622 5622 
R
2
 0.8948 0.8951 0.8948 0.8951 
1. Table 6.6 reports firm fixed effect regression, estimated for equation 5.3. 
2. The symbols “***”, “**” , “*” denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and in 
parenthesis, white’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are shown. 
3. “Het_per” stands for heterogeneous loan, defined in appendix. “Policy” stands for dummy variable that takes 1 for the 
period from 2001 to 2013. “Rec_hom” stands for recovery of charged off of homogenous loan. “Rec_het” stands for 
recovery of charged off of heterogeneous loan. “Rec_hompolicy” is the interaction between “Rec_hom” and “policy”. 
“Rec_hetpolicy” is the interaction between “Rec_het” and “policy”. “Cap1” stands for tier 1 capital ratio. “Pll” stands 
for provision for loan and  lease losses. “lall” is the lagged variable of allowance for loan and lease losses. “ldnpa” is 
the lagged variable of changes in non-performing loan. “Size” stands for log of total assets.”rnoninter” stands for 
noninterest income. “lcontr” is the lagged variable of “Contract” dummy variable. “ldnpa_lcon” is the interaction 
between “ldnpa” and “lcontr”. “lexpan” is the lagged variable of “Expans” dummy variable. “ldnpa_lexp” is the 
interaction between “ldnpa” and “lexpan”.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
Our objective is to observe the changes in US banking industry in terms of income smoothing 
and mechanism of income smoothing after the policy change. FFIEC implements a stricter policy 
in 1999. This policy makes it difficult to discretionary charge off of homogenous loan that was 
observed in 90s. This study finds out the impact of the policy in income smoothing mechanism 
that is observed in 90s and tries to find out whether this mechanism has shifted to other avenue. 
No previous study addresses the impact of FFIEC policy change in 1999. Bank regulators are 
always concerned about the allowance for loan and lease losses. Banks need to make a 
coordinated approach among the previous allowance, current year provision, charge off and 
recovery to have a stable ending allowance. In this paper we have used the equations developed 
by Liu and Ryan’s (2006) with few changes. This study covers a period of 1991 to 2013 to 
observe the impact of the policy change.  
We find that income smoothing continues after the policy change. Though we do not find any 
association between heterogeneous loans and provisioning, we find association between 
provisioning and noninterest income.  
Restrictive regulations have influenced the income smoothing mechanism. The association 
between previous year charge off of homogenous loan and current year recovery has been 
weakened after policy change. Policy has addressed the concern of the changing phenomenon in 
late 90s regarding the charge off of homogenous loan. To some extent, policy achieves its 
intended objectives. Charge off from homogenous loan carries more reliable information now 
than before policy change as policy impacts the discretionary relationship between previous year 
charge off of homogenous loan and current year recovery. It necessarily implies that recovery 
from homogeneous loan is independent of previous year charge off of homogenous loan. Bank 
recovers from charge off of homogenous loan that is not advertently charged off in previous 
year.  Banks’ behaviour regarding the association between previous year charge off and current 
year recovery of heterogeneous loan does not change after policy change. Banks still charge off 
of heterogeneous loan to smooth income. It can be said that guideline for application of 
methodology and documentation of the methodology does not impact the behaviour regarding 
heterogeneous loan. It implies that regulations are not comprehensive enough to restrict the 
judgement that is used to provision the heterogeneous loan.  Moreover, current year recovery of 
homogenous loan and gross loan charge off has not changed after policy change. However, 
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current year recovery of heterogeneous loan and gross loan charge off has increased after policy 
change.  
Income smoothing process through loan loss allowance account is a coordinated approach. Lead 
lag relationship between charge off and recovery for homogenous loan has been weakened after 
policy change. On the other hand, that relationship for heterogeneous loan does not change after 
policy change. Moreover, association between current year recovery from heterogeneous loan 
and gross loan charge off has been stronger even after policy change. As FFIEC policy in 1999 
restricts the smoothing mechanism through charge off and recovery of homogenous loan, it 
would be no exaggeration to posit that income smoothing mechanism has been shifting after 
policy change.  
This study sheds light on policy change. So policymakers will get an idea on whether policy 
achieves its intended effect. They also get idea how the income smoothing mechanism might 
continue in future and what issues policymakers need to address to this changing phenomenon. 
Investors and analyst are always worried about the information they use for analysis. They might 
get more credible information about allowance, charge off, recovery, and provision now than 
before policy change. This study definitely contributes to income smoothing literatures of US 
banking industry. 
This study is not without limitations. As mentioned earlier, we do not find any association 
between provisioning and heterogeneous loans though we expected so after policy change. So it 
necessarily means there are other forces which drive the income smoothing behaviour. Though 
we find an association between provisioning and noninterest income, it is not clear which 
component of noninterest income is basically contributing to the provisioning. Mamun, Meier 
and Wilson (2012) segregate the noninterest income in three broad categories. Those are 
stakeholder activity (SA), fee for service activity (FFS) and traditional fee income (TFI). If any 
future study sheds light on which component of noninterest income is basically the driving force 
for provisioning, interesting finding might be added to the income smoothing literature.  
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Appendix 
Variable construction 
This appendix contains the definition of variables and related item code taken from FR Y-9C. 
Variable Definition Table 
Variable Name Variable Definition Item Code 
ROA Measured by net income over 
lagged total assets 
(bhck4340/lbhck2170) 
X Measured by net interest income 
before provision for loan and 
lease losses over lagged total 
assets. 
(bhck4074/lbhck2170) 
PLL Measured by provision for loan 
and lease losses over lagged 
total loan and lease financing 
receivables 
(bhck4230/lbhck2122) 
ALL Measured by allowance for loan 
and lease losses over lagged 
total loan and lease financing 
receivables 
(bhck3123/lbhck2122) 
Hom_per Homogenous loan consists of 
secured by 1-4 family residential 
properties , loans to depository 
institutions and acceptances of 
other banks, loans to individuals 
for household, family, and other 
personal expenditures. This 
homogenous loan is scaled by 
lagged total loan and lease 
financing receivables. 
 
 1991-1995 (bhdm1797+bhdm5367+bhdm5368+ 
bhck2008+bhck2011)/lbhck2122 
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 1996-2000 (bhdm1797+bhdm5367+bhdm5368+ 
bhck1292+bhck1755+bhck1296+ 
bhck2008+bhck2011)/lbhck2122 
 2001-2010 (bhdm1797+bhdm5367+bhdm5368+ 
bhck1292+bhck1296+ 
bhckb538+bhckb539+bhck2011)/lbhck212
2 
 2011-2013 (bhdm1797+bhdm5367+bhdm5368+ 
bhck1292+bhck1296+ 
bhckB538+bhckB539+bhckK137+bhckK2
07)/lbhck2122 
Het_per Heterogeneous loan consists of 
real estate loan (construction, 
land development, and other 
land loans, secured by farmland, 
secured by multifamily (5 or 
more) residential properties, 
secured by nonfarm 
nonresidential properties), loans 
to finance agricultural 
production and other loans to 
farmers, commercial and 
industrial loans, and lease 
financing receivables.  These 
heterogeneous loans are scaled 
by lagged total loan and lease 
financing receivables. 
 
 
 1991-2006 (bhdm1415+bhdm1420+ 
bhdm1460+bhdm1480+ bhck1590+ 
bhck1763+bhck1764+ bhck2081+ 
bhck2182+bhck2183)/lbhck2122 
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 2007 (bhdm1415+bhdm1420+ 
bhdm1460+bhdm1480+ bhck1590+ 
bhck1763+bhck1764+ bhck2081+ 
bhckf162+bhckf163)/lbhck2122 
 2008-2013 (bhckf158+bhckf159+bhdm1420+ 
bhdm1460+bhckf160+bhckf161+ 
bhck1590+ bhck1763+bhck1764+ 
bhck2081+ 
bhckf162+bhckf163)/lbhck2122 
GLCO Measured by Charge offs on 
loans and leases over lagged 
total loan and lease financing 
receivables 
bhck4635/lbhck2122 
GLCO_hom Measured by charge off of 
respective homogenous loan 
defined before in Hom_per over 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables. 
 
 1991-2000 (bhck5411+bhck5413+ 
bhck4653+bhck4654+ 
bhck4656+bhck4657)/lbhck2122 
 2001 (bhck5411+bhck5413+ 
bhck4653+bhck4654+ 
bhckb514+bhckb516)/lbhck2122 
 2002-2010 (bhck5411+bhckc234+bhckc235+ 
bhck4653+bhck4654+ 
bhckb514+bhckb516)/lbhck2122 
 2011-2013 (bhck5411+bhckc234+bhckc235+ 
bhck4653+bhck4654+ 
bhckb514+bhckk129+bhckk205)/lbhck212
2 
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GLCO_het Measured by charge off of 
respective heterogeneous  loan 
defined before in Het_per 
(heterogeneous loan) over 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables. 
 
 1991-2000 (bhck3582+bhck3584+bhck3588+bhck359
0+ bhck4655+ bhck4645+bhck4646+ 
bhck4643+ 
bhck4658+bhck4659)/lbhck2122 
 2001-2006 (Bhck3582+bhck3584+bhck3588+bhck359
0+bhckb513+ Bhck4655+ 
Bhck4645+bhck4646+ Bhck4643+ 
Bhck4658+bhck4659)/lbhck2122 
 2007 (Bhck3582+bhck3584+bhck3588+bhck359
0+bhckb513+ Bhck4655+ 
Bhck4645+bhck4646+ Bhck4643+ 
Bhckf185+bhckc880)/lbhck2122 
 2008-2013 (bhckc891+bhckc893+bhck3584+bhck358
8+bhckc895+bhckc897+bhckb512+ 
bhck4655+ bhck4645+bhck4646+ 
bhck4643+ 
bhckf185+bhckc880)/lbhck2122 
Rec Measured by total recovery over 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables 
bhck4605/lbhck2122 
Rec_hom Measured by Recovery of 
respective homogenous loan 
defined before in Hom_per  over 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables 
 
 1991-2000 (bhck5412+bhck5414+ 
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bhck4663+bhck4664+ 
bhck4666+bhck4667)/lbhck2122 
 2001 (bhck5412+bhck5414+ 
bhck4663+bhck4664+ 
bhckb515+bhckb517)/lbhck2122 
 2002-2010 (bhck5412+bhckc217+bhckc218+ 
bhck4663+bhck4664+ 
bhckb515+bhckb517)/lbhck2122 
 2011-2013 (bhck5412+bhckc217+bhckc218+ 
bhck4663+bhck4664+ 
bhckb515+bhckk133+bhckk206)/lbchk212
2 
Rec_het Measured by Recovery of 
respective heterogenous loan 
defined before in Het_per 
(heterogeneous loan) over 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables 
 
 1991-2000 (bhck3583+bhck3585+bhck3589+bhck359
1+ bhck4665+ bhck4617+bhck4618+ 
bhck4627+ 
Bhck4668+bhck4669)/lbhck2122 
 2001-2006 (Bhck3583+bhck3585+bhck3589+bhck359
1+bhckb513+ Bhck4665+ 
Bhck4617+bhck4618+ Bhck4627+ 
Bhck4668+bhck4669)/lbhck2122 
 2007 (bhck3583+bhck3585+bhck3589+bhck359
1+bhckb513+ bhck4665+ 
bhck4617+bhck4618+ bhck4627+ 
bhckf187+bhckf188)/lbhck2122 
 2008-2013 (bhckc892+bhckc894+bhck3585+bhck358
9+bhckc896+bhckc898+bhckb513+ 
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bhck4665+ bhck4617+bhck4618+ 
bhck4627+ 
bhckf187+bhckf188)/lbhck2122 
NLCO Measured by gross loan charge 
off net of recovery, scaled by 
lagged total loans and lease 
financing receivables 
(GLCO-REC) 
NLCO_hom Measured by gross loan charge 
off of homogenous loan net of 
recovery from homogenous loan, 
scaled by lagged total loan and 
lease financing receivables. 
 
(GLCO_hom-REC_hom) 
NLCO_het Measured by gross loan charge 
off of heterogeneous loan net of 
recovery from heterogeneous 
loan, scaled by lagged total loan 
and lease financing receivables. 
 
(GLCO_het-REC_het) 
Dnpa Non-performing asset consists of 
past due 90 days or more and 
still accruing and nonaccrual 
assets. Change in non-
performing asset is measured by 
last year non-performing loans 
subtracted from this year non-
performing loans, scaled by 
lagged total loan and lease 
financing receivables. 
(bhck5525+bhck5526-lbhck5525-
lbhck5526)/lbhck2122 
Cap1 Measured by tier 1 capital over 
total risk weighted assets from 
1996 to 2013. Proxy for this 
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variable is measured by total 
equity over lagged total asset for 
the period from 1991 to 1995. 
 1991-1995 (bhck3210/lbhck2170) 
 1996-2013 (bhck8274/bhcka223) 
Size Measured by log of total assets. Log(bhck2170)  
Rnoninter Measured by total noninterest 
income over total income  
(bhck4079/bhck4107+bhck4079) 
Contract Measured based on business 
cycle defined by the National 
Bureau of Research. 
Contractionary (Contract) period 
is 2001, 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
Expans Measured based on business 
cycle defined by the National 
Bureau of Research. 
Expansionary (Expans) period is 
all period except the periods 
defined in Contract variable. 
 
 
   
 
